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THE EXECUTION OF ANGEL BREARD:
THE UNITED STATES FEDERALIST SYSTEM AS
SCAPEGOAT FOR THE VIOLATION OF AN ICJ
ORDER
Jane Amory Allen-
I. INTRODUCTION
To quote the famous case, The Paquete Habana, "International law is
a part of our law."' When the Commonwealth of Virginia executed Angel
Breard, the United States violated international law. Not only did the
Commonwealth of Virginia violate the treaty obligations of its federal
government, but the United States failed to comply with the Order of
Provisional Measures set forth by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
The outpouring of official dualism through all stages of the case as well as
the failure to afford the decision of the ICJ its due respect were affronts to
the international community. Mr. Breard had individual rights under the
Vienna Convention which, at the minimum, justified compliance with the
Order of the ICJ and a delay of his execution. The federal government was
empowered to comply with the Order of the ICJ through the formal means
of habeas corpus review as well as internal diplomatic measures or
application of the Supreme Court's Rules. None of these measures were
taken. By failing to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the
ICJ, the United States violated international law and compromised its
accountability in the international community.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND TO THE EXECUTION OF
ANGEL BREARD
On June 24, 1993, the Circuit Court in Arlington County, Virginia,
convicted Angel Breard, a citizen of Paraguay who came to the United
States in 1986, of the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie.
2
In addition to forensic evidence placing him at the scene of the crime and
other apparently clear evidence, 3 Breard's confession served as the basis of
• Jane A. Allen is a third-year law student at the University of Richmond T.C. Williams
School of Law. She is currently the Editor-in-Chief of the Richmond Journal of Law and
the Public Interest and upon graduation, she will work for the law firm of Odin, Feldman
& Pittleman, P.C., located in Fairfax, Virginia.
1 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1990).
2 Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
3 [d. at 1353.
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his conviction. The State of Virginia sentenced Breard to death and set his
date of execution for April 14, 1998.
Following his conviction in the Circuit Court, Breard exhausted his
state remedies. Breard filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia which was dismissed.4 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed this dismissal.5
Although he invoked the services of two sets of court-appointed
counsel, Breard did not claim a violation of his rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of April 24, 1963 obligates the United
States, including the Commonwealth of Virginia, to advise persons of
their right to communicate with, and receive assistance from, the consular
officers of their Nation.6 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Vienna Convention) is a self-executing, globally-ratified treaty to which
both the United States and Paraguay are parties.7 By common admission,8
Mr. Breard was not advised of his right to communicate with and receive
assistance from the State of Paraguay, as required by the Vienna
Convention. Absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the
treaty in that State. 9 It is the rule in the United States that assertions of
error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to
form the basis for relief in habeas proceedings; otherwise, such claims are
considered defaulted.' 0 Breard's failure to assert his Vienna Convention
claim in state court constituted a failure to exercise his rights under the
Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of the United States and
the Commonwealth of Virginia." Therefore, Breard's treaty-based claim
was waived.
In parallel proceedings, Paraguay sued the Commonwealth of Virginia
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for
violation of the treaties between the United States and Paraguay, the
vacatur of the capital conviction and death sentence imposed by Virginia
4 Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996).
5 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
6 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].7 Id.
8 Henry J. Richardson, The Execution ofAngel Breard by the United States; Violating an
Order of the International Court of Justice, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 121, 122
(1998).
9 Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1355 (1998); see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S.
717, 723 (1988); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700
(1988).
10 Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1355 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)).
11 Id. at 1355.
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in violation of the treaties, and an injunction against further violations. 12
The U.S. District Court dismissed Paraguay's claim for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction 13 and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 14 The dismissal was
affirmed on the grounds that the violation of the Vienna Convention was
not "ongoing" or "continuing" and Paraguay was not seeking
"prospective" relief, both of which would be required under the Ex parte
Young 15 exception to the Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine.
16
In the context of the procedural default rule, Breard's failure to raise
his treaty claim makes Paraguay's claim that its embassy and consular
officials did not learn of the arrest of Breard until two years later
17
irrelevant. This procedural failure also strips the significance of
Paraguay's claim that had its assistance been available from the beginning
of Mr. Breard's trial, it would have supplied him with legal counsel who
would have advised him to plead guilty prior to trial in return for a life
sentence in prison.18 Paraguay appealed the decision of the Fourth Circuit,
as Breard appealed the Eastern District of Virginia's dismissal of his state
habeas corpus petitionl9and the subsequent affirmance by the Fourth
Circuit. On the petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
21States heard both cases on April 14, 1998.
Due to the application of the procedural default doctrine, the Republic
of Paraguay's only remaining source of redress for the United States'
violation of the Vienna Convention was to pursue the matter in the ICJ.
Paraguay filed an Application with the ICJ stating a dispute over alleged
violations by the United States of the Vienna Convention in that the
United States, as the country responsible for the acts or omissions of its
federal states, failed to provide the notification required by the Vienna
Convention.
22
In connection with its Application, Paraguay also filed an urgent
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures in order to preserve its
12 Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996).
13 Id. at 1269.
14 Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
15 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (setting forth the exception whereby federal
courts may exercise jurisdiction over claims against state officials by persons at risk of or
suffering from violations by those officials of federally protected rights, if (1) the
violation for which relief is sought is an ongoing one, and (2) the relief sought is only
prospective); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985).16Allen, 134 F.3d at 626.
17 Richardson, supra note 8, at 122.18 [d.
19 See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996).
20 Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
21See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
22 See Richardson, supra note 8, at 123.
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rights under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court.23 In its urgent Request
for Provisional Measures, Paraguay stated that it was not able to contact
Mr. Breard to offer him necessary assistance; that Mr. Breard "made a
number of objectively unreasonable decisions during the criminal
proceedings against him, which were conducted without translation"; and
he "did not comprehend the fundamental difference between the criminal
justice systems of the United States and Paraguay. ' 24 Paraguay pled that
the Court indicate that, pending final judgment, the United States should
not execute Mr. Breard, and that it report to the Court all actions taken to
carry out the abrogation of the execution. 2 On April 9, 1998, following
arguments at the Hague by Paraguay and the United States, the ICJ issued
a unanimous Opinion, which included the vote of the highly respected
President of the Court-U.S. citizen Judge Schwebel. The ICJ held the
following: a valid dispute does exist between Paraguay and the United
States over which the Court has prima facie jurisdiction under the
Optional Protocol; that Mr. Breard's execution on April 14 would render it
impossible for the Court to order the relief sought by Paraguay, causing
irreparable harm to its rights; that the issue of entitlement of the federal
states of the United States to order the death penalty is not before the
Court, nor is the Court acting as a court of criminal appeal; that proper
circumstances exist for it to indicate provisional measures under Article
41 of its Statute; and that measures indicated by the Court for a stay of
execution would be provisional in nature and would not prejudge any
findings the Court would make on the merits.26 The ICJ set forth "the
following provisional measures: The United States should take all
measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings and should
inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation
of this Order."
27
Following the issuance of the ICJ's Order, the executive branch of the
United States government initiated two divergent strategies. In response to
a rare request by the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice, through
the Solicitor-General, submitted a fifty-two page brief arguing that the ICJ
Order did not justify halting Breard's execution nor did the violations of
23 See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the
Government of the Republic of Paraguay, Apr. 3, 1998, http://www.icj-cij.org/
idocket/ipau ...ipausprovisionalmeasures980403.html (visited Nov. 23, 1998) [hereinafter
Request for Provisional Measures].24 Id. at4.
251d. at 41.
26 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America), Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures, Order, Apr. 9, 1998, http:// www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ipaus/
ipausorder/ipausorder090498.htm (visited Nov. 23, 1998) [hereinafter ICJ Order].
2 7
[d.
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the Vienna Convention justify a new trial.28 Contrary to the position
assumed by the Department of Justice, the Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, sent a letter to Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore, III,
requesting him to delay Breard's execution until the ICJ ruled on the
merits of the case. Citing diplomatic and political considerations,
including possible effects of international reciprocity as grounds for
delaying the execution, a spokesperson for Albright stated "[w]e want
American citizens who travel abroad to get the best possible opportunity
to have the best possible justice."2 9 Although the State Department agreed
with the Justice Department's assertions that there was no legal basis for
the Supreme Court to halt the execution, they cited Albright's appeal to
Gilmore as within the interests of diplomacy. 30 Despite the distinction
made between legal and diplomatic grounds, the position taken by the
Department of Justice was wholly inconsistent with the position taken by
the Department of State. Following the ambiguous message sent by the
Executive Branch, Governor Gilmore announced that he was reviewing
Albright's letter and awaiting the Supreme Court's decision.
On the evening of April 14, 1998, the United States Supreme Court
denied all petitions brought by the Republic of Paraguay and Mr. Breard.31
The Supreme Court found that the Vienna Convention does not trump the
procedural default doctrine and the state authorities' violation of consular
notification provisions of the Vienna Convention had no continuing
consequences which would permit Paraguay to bring suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. 32 After Governor Gilmore then rejected a clemency
plea, Mr. Breard was put to death by lethal injection, shortly before 11:00
p.m. on the night of April 14, 1998.33
III. THE UNITED STATES FEDERALIST SYSTEM
A United States violation of the Order of the ICJ hinges upon a
consideration of state and national responsibilities within the United
States' tradition of Federalism. Foreign affairs of the United States are the
concern of the federal or national government exclusively. The United
States government is responsible, as a matter of international law, for
assuring the nation's compliance with its international obligations,
regardless of how it implements those responsibilities domestically. 34 The
28 Brooke A. Masters, Albright Urges Va. to Delay Execution, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
1998, at BI.2 9 Id.
3 0 d.31 Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1356 (1998).
32 See id.
33 David Stout, Clemency Denied, Paraguayan is Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998,
at Al.
34 Ronan Doherty, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal Law
Implicates Federal Responsibility Under International Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 1281 (1996).
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United States Constitution affirmatively grants foreign affairs powers to
the federal government35 through the following mechanisms: the
regulation of commerce with foreign nations;36 definition of uniform rules
of naturalization; 37 regulation of the value of "foreign Coin;" 38 authority to
raise and command armed services; 39 authority to declare War, grant
letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water; capacity to enter treaties with foreign nations;41 ability
to receive 42 and appoint ambassadors; 43 and the ability to hear cases
arising under "the Laws of the U.S. and Treaties", "Cases affecting
Ambassadors", "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction",
"Controversies to which the U.S. shall be a Party" and "Controversies
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or
subjects. ' 44 In addition to the affirmative grants of foreign affairs powers
to the federal government, the United States Constitution affirmatively
denies state control over foreign affairs issues. States may not: enter
treaties, alliances, or confederations with other countries; 45 enter into any
agreement or compact with a foreign power without consent of
Congress; 46 grant letters of marque or reprisal; 47 lay imposts or duties on
imports or exports without congressional consent;48 or, engage in War,
unless actually invaded.49
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of national power
in all matters relating to foreign affairs and the inherent danger of state
action in this field.5° In a famous opinion, Justice Sutherland argued that
the states had never possessed any sovereignty in the international sense.
51
Justice Sutherland concluded that "even if the power to make treaties and
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, it would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality. 52
35 See generally LOuIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 15 (1972).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.3 7 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 4.381Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 5.39 Id. at art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 12-15; id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1.40 d. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
4 1
Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.4 2 [d. at art. II, § 3.
4 3
Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4 4 [d. at art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
4 5 Id. at art. I, § 10, c1. 1.4 6 Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
4 7 Id. at art. I, § 10, ci. 1.481Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 2.4 9 Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
50 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1941).
51 See Doherty, supra note 34 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 317-18 (1936)).52 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 317-18.
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If a specific power is not granted to the federal government in the
Constitution, that power is left to the states.53 Although the federal
government's Constitutional authority over foreign affairs is certain, the
reservation of State authority over matters not specifically enumerated as
within the federal realm of authority, complicates this division of power.
The organization of authority created by the United States Constitution
has been described as creating a system of "dual sovereignty." 54 Those
powers not Constitutionally assigned to the federal government enable
"the individual states to retain and exercise powers that have significant
collateral foreign affairs implications in a number of important contexts.
. [In particular], the states' administration of the death penalty implicates
and complicates the international interests of the United States and pits
federal control over foreign affairs against the nation's commitment to
federalism." 
55
As in the case of Mr. Breard, Virginia's execution of its laws frustrated
the United States' fulfillment of its international legal obligations. The
terms of the treaty and the United States Constitution itself compelled the
United States to uphold the request of the ICJ to delay the execution of
Mr. Breard. First, the Vienna Convention requires that foreign nationals
under arrest and their respective consulates be allowed to communicate
with one another. 56 Second, the foreign national can also require the host
country to inform his foreign consulate of the arrest.57 Third, the Vienna
Convention requires a foreign national to be informed of his right to
consulate, without delay. 58 Finally, consular officers shall have the right to
visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention,
as well as send him communications, which are to be delivered without
delay. 59 Since treaties are Constitutionally designated "the supreme Law
of the Land,, 60 their terms should be upheld. The United States, by its own
admission, violated the terms of this treaty in Mr. Breard's case.
61
Furthermore, executive and judicial mechanisms were available which
would have allowed the United States to uphold its international
obligations without compromising its commitment to federalism. The
United States could have taken greater strides to comply with the Order of
53 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
54 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997).
55 Doherty, supra note 34, at 1281.
56 Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 36, 21 U.S.T at 101.
5 7 Id.
5 8 [d.
5 9 Id.
6 0 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
61 James P. Rubin, Text of Statement Released in Asuncion, Paraguay on Behalf of the
United States of America, http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/
ps981104.html (visited Dec. 2, 1998); Richardson, supra note 8.
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the ICJ and delay the execution of Breard until such time as a decision
could be made on the merits regarding the United States' violation of the
Vienna Convention.
Although treaties are the supreme Law of the Land, the United States
federalist system, as a system of dual sovereignty, merits a discussion of
whether the federal government possesses the power to force states to
carry out treaty obligations. The general rule when an international treaty
and state law conflict is that the international treaty overrides. This rule of
law is based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
62
However, in the 1950's, concerns arose that this treaty-making power
would allow members of the executive to circumvent the constitutional
limits on the federal government. Although the Senate Judiciary
committee's Bricker Amendment to the Constitution repeatedly failed,
3
the Supreme Court's decision in Reid v. Covert64 settled the issue. Reid
involved a military dependent tried before a military tribunal rather than a
civilian court, for an alleged murder in Great Britain. The relevant treaty
in Reid permitted U.S. military courts to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over U.S. servicemen and their dependents in cases involving criminal
offenses committed in Great Britain.6 5 In ruling that the provision
arranging for military trials of U.S. dependents could not escape the
requirements of the Constitution, the Court explained that "no agreement
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution."66 So long as treaties comply with the U.S. Constitution,
they are valid.
The validity of the Vienna Convention was not in dispute in the case
of Breard. However, it is demonstrative of the distinction between the
federal government's power to develop international law and its ability to
require local governments to administer it. Breard was arrested, detained
and prosecuted by Virginia officials. Virginia officials failed to notify the
Consular Office in Paraguay of Breard's arrest for two years. Virginia
officials failed to notify Breard of his right to contact his Consular Office.
Therefore, the discussion hinges not on whether a state of the United
States violated a provision of the Vienna Convention, but rather, what the
United States, as the signatory party, could do about it.
A. The United States' scope of power to compel states to comply with
international treaties.
62 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
63 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 206 (12th ed. 1991).
64 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
65 [d.
6 6 [d. at 15.
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States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States." Yet
despite the "residuary and inviolable sovereignty" 68 of the States, the
structure of the Constitution forbids the federal government from
compelling the States to enact or administer federal law.69 In Printz v.
United States, the Supreme Court described the Brady Act, which required
that state law enforcement officers perform background checks, as forced
participation in the administration of a federal program.7 0 Under a Printz
analysis, legislation passed by the federal government compelling the
states to enact or administer federal law, is unconstitutional. However, the
Printz argument, in an international context, has yet to be addressed by the
Supreme Court.
The federal government's authority to require local government
officials to carry out the terms of the Vienna Convention depends on the
resolution of the following issues: (1) whether the Vienna Convention
creates personal rights of a constitutional nature; and (2) if the Vienna
Convention does not create personal rights of a constitutional nature,
whether the federal government may rely on its constitutional powers to
make foreign policy. If the Vienna Convention creates personal rights of a
constitutional nature, the federal government might be able to place an
affirmative obligation on the states to notify aliens of their rights under the
treaty. The authority of the federal government to compel such
notification by the states arises from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,7 ' which was the justification for Miranda.y2
1. The Vienna Convention is a source of individual rights.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in the Republic
of Paraguay v. Allen,y3 expressed in dicta that the Vienna Convention
does not create private rights of action. As distinguished from Breard's
case, the plaintiff in Allen was not an individual, but the Republic of
Paraguay with enforcement rights as a signing party to the Vienna
Convention. Furthermore, "the district court in Allen did not cite any
authority or engage in any analysis to support its conclusion that the
Vienna Convention does not create privately enforceable rights."7 4 Due to
67 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).68 Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 39).
69New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
7 0 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
71 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law"); see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(holding that constitutional rights are applicable and enforceable against the states when
the rights implicate fundamental principles of liberty and justice).
72 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).73Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274.
74 James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The Impact of
Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations on State
Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997,
1019 (1998).
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application of the procedural default rule, the Supreme Court in Breard v.
Greene did not reach the question of whether Mr. Breard had personal
rights under the Vienna Convention. 75 However, the holding of the
Supreme Court that "by not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state
court, habeas petitioner procedurally defaulted on this claim,"76 strongly
implies that Mr. Breard had individual rights under the treaty which he
unfortunately, waived.
In the carefully crafted press release from the U.S. Department of
State, James Rubin stated that the "failure to notify Mr. Breard was
unquestionably a violation of an obligation owed to the Government of
Paraguay., 77 Although this statement seems only to express an obligation
to the Republic of Paraguay, James Rubin also states that the United
States intends to ". . . ensure that the consular rights of foreign nationals in
the United States are respected, and that Paraguayan and other foreign
nationals in the United States are properly notified of their right to request
consular assistance if they are arrested or detained. 78 It is an untenable
conclusion that this treaty which provides a foreign national with the right
to request consular assistance in the case of arrest, does not provide such
foreign national a set of individual rights on that basis.
To determine whether a treaty may be privately enforced, the intent of
the singing parties as evidenced by the language of the treaties should be
analyzed.79 Although the Preamble to the Vienna Convention recognizes
that "the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit
individuals,"8 such right could not inhere in the Nation without inhering
in the individual. Furthermore, the text of the treaty states that "the
authorities of the receiving State shall inform the [arrested or imprisoned
person]. . . of his rights without delay."' 1 The text of the Vienna
Convention, as well as the purpose behind it, provide a source of
individual rights for foreign nationals.
82
Addressing a situation comparable to that of Breard, in ruling on a
case in which an arrested alien was not advised of his ability to contact his
foreign consulate, the Fifth Circuit referred to the alien's ability to contact
75 Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1352.76 [d. at 1355.
77 Rubin, supra note 61.
7 8 [d.
79 Deeken, supra note 74; see Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929, 937 (1988); see also Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 929 F. Supp. 1269,
1274.
80 Vienna Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.811d. at art. 36, § 1(b).
82 The Clinton Administration in the Breard case took the view that the treaty did not
create personal rights and was a matter for country-to-country diplomacy. Linda
Greenhouse, Court Weighs Execution of Foreigner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A14.
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his consulate as "his rights under the Convention."83 However, due to the
fact that the alien's claims in Faulder were dismissible on other grounds,
the court did not examine whether the rights were privately enforceable.
8 4
The holding of the United States Supreme Court, the language of the
Vienna Convention and the statements made by the spokesperson for the
Secretary of State all indicate that Mr. Breard had individual rights under
the Vienna Convention.
2. The individual rights afforded by the Vienna Convention are of
constitutional significance.
The failure of the police to inform a foreign national of his "rights"
under the Vienna Convention should rise to the level of rights
constitutionally guaranteed. Opponents of this proposition would refer to
85the Second Circuit's decision in Waldron v. INS. The Second Circuit in
Waldron held that the failure of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to inform the defendant of the Vienna Convention did not
constitute a violation of fundamental liberties with constitutional origins.
86
Although the failure to inform an arrested alien of his ability to contact his
consulate may not, in the case of a finding of deportability,8 7 undermine
the alien's fundamental liberties, this failure to inform Mr. Breard's
consulate violated his fundamental liberties. Most significantly, Mr.
Breard was arrested for capital murder. A conviction for capital murder,
could and did, eventually deprive Mr. Breard of his fundamental right to
life. The alien in Waldron did not have a fundamental right to contact his
consulate or to reside in the United States; however, a result of the failure
to notify Mr. Breard's consulate of his arrest was his plea of guilty for
capital murder.
Despite the concern that "... the Vienna Convention may create rights
for aliens above and beyond the constitutional safeguards afforded to
citizens,"8 8 this is a measure the United States must take in death penalty
cases. Not only is the death penalty an inherently unique form of
punishment, but as of 1996, 108 countries had banned the death penalty
altogether (including all European states and eight South American states,
89one of which is Paraguay). In addition to the language barrier which
often impedes an alien's ability to understand the legal implications of his
actions, without the aid of his consular, it is not likely that a foreign
national accused of capital murder will be able to understand the grave
consequences of his decisions following arrest. The irreversibility of the
83 Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 467 (1996).
84 [d.
85 Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1993).
8 6 Id. at 518.
87 [d.
88 Deeken, supra note 74, at 1025.
89 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (2d ed. 1997).
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death penalty and the distinctive circumstances surrounding an alien's
arrest for murder, demand that notification of the alien's consulate rise to
the level of constitutional rights in that narrow situation. Mr. Breard's due
process rights were violated at every step of the legal process during the
two years following his arrest up to the time the Republic of Paraguay was
notified. The Republic of Paraguay has stated that they would have
advised Mr. Breard to pled guilty in exchange for a life sentence. 9 Had
Mr. Breard's individual rights under the Vienna Convention been upheld,
it appears likely that he would have pled guilty in order to preserve his
life. This violation of the Vienna Convention was a violation of his
fundamental rights of constitutional proportions.
The Vienna Convention is a source of individual rights of
constitutional significance, which were undisputably violated by Virginia
officials. Irrespective of what the federal government could have done to
force the states to comply with the Vienna Convention prior to Mr.
Breard's sentencing, the United States voluntarily submitted to the ICJ on
the Request for Provisional Measures. 91 Although addressing the "...
gravity and importance of the decision," 92 the United States nevertheless
failed to comply with the Order of the ICJ. Based on the nature of the
rights which were violated, and the fact that these rights were bestowed by
the supreme Law of the Land, the federal government should have, at the
minimum, complied with the Order of the ICJ and delayed the execution
of Mr. Breard. The United States used the federalist system as an excuse,
justifying the failure of its measures to ensure that Mr. Breard was not
executed pending the final decision of the ICJ. Yet, to quote Justice
O'Connor, "the other essential element of our federalist tradition is mutual
trust and respect .... Just as state courts are expected to follow the dictates
of the Constitution and federal statutes, domestic courts should faithfully
recognize the obligations imposed by international law."93 Mutual trust
and respect dictated that the United States should have truly exhausted all
possibilities in their effort to comply with the ICJ Order. However, the
United States chose not to exercise those options which would have
allowed it to honor its international obligations.
IV. UN-SEIZED OPPORTUNITIES, ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES, TO
COMPLY WITH THE ICJ ORDER.
A. The federal habeas corpus review as an exercise of federal authority
over state actions.
90 Richardson, supra note 8, at 122.
9' Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. V. U.S.),
http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/ipaus/ipauser980407/ipauscr980407.html (visited Nov. 23,
1998).
92 Id.
93 Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35,
41(1996).
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Federal control over the state's administration of criminal law is
limited. However, one method of federal control, in the death penalty
context, is the federal habeas corpus review of state law convictions and
sentences. The federal government has the formal opportunity to review
the state law sentences. Regardless of the frequency with which federal
courts alter the outcome of a case in deference to international law, federal
courts have the power and opportunity to do so through the review of
habeas corpus petitions. 94 This option was available to the federal courts
in the appeals instituted by Breard and Paraguay. In fact, "the Supreme
Court has reversed state-level practices in cases in which they have had
'more than an incidental effect' on foreign relations, a threshold Breard
plainly met."95 However, both the Fourth Circuit and the United States
Supreme Court denied the habeas petitions instituted on behalf of Breard,
in spite of the United States' concession that treaty notification
requirements had not been met. Through the judiciary's actions in the
Breard case, "the federal government proved utterly unwilling to
discipline Virginia in the wake of the violation and in the face of the ICJ
Order. The lesson of the Breard episode for state authorities: Don't be too
anxious about respecting international law."
96
B. Diplomatic pressure as a source of federal authority over state actions.
In addition to the judiciary's formal review, the executive branch,
through the Department of Justice and State Department had the
opportunity to present views on the Virginia sentence. The Supreme Court
made a rare request 97 that the Department of Justice submit a brief
explaining their position on the ICJ Order indicating that the United States
should take ". . . all measures at its disposal" to delay the execution of
Breard.98 The brief submitted by the Solicitor-General to the Supreme
Court argued that the ICJ Order did not justify halting Breard's execution
while it trumpeted the fact that pocket-sized reference cards were issued to
law enforcement officers as demonstrative of their efforts to prevent
future violations. Presenting a view opposite that of the Department of
Justice, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sent a letter to the Governor
of Virginia requesting a stay of execution until such time as the ICJ could
render a decision, for diplomatic reasons. The public positions of the
Department of Justice and the Secretary of State were incompatible. If the
Solicitor General had urged the Supreme Court ". . . to accept the case for
appeal and set the argument for some time in the fall after the ICJ
argument, on the grounds that it was not in the national interest of the U.S.
judiciary to be seen in open conflict on this question with a valid Order of
94 See id. at 42.
95 Peter J. Spiro, States That Flout World Opinion May Incur Loss, NAT'L L.J., May 4,
1998, at A23.
96 Id.
97 Richardson, supra note 8, at 125 (stating that a request by the Supreme Court for the
views of the Justice Department is unusual in death penalty cases).
98 ICJ Order, supra note 26.
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the ICJ, the voices would have been joined in support of the Secretary of
State's correct warning about the welfare of U.S. citizens abroad." 99
However, the federal government's failure to urge delay with a unified
voice on this issue with significant international implications,
demonstrates an un-seized opportunity to comply with the ICJ Order.
00
C. Application of the Supreme Court's timetable as an additional measure
which would have resulted in compliance with the ICJ Order.
Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg dissented on the grounds that
Virginia's execution schedule leaves less time for the Court to consider the
petitions than the Court's rules provide for in ordinary cases. 1°1 Justice
Stevens stated that the Court has "... . been deprived of the normal time for
considered deliberation by the Commonwealth's decision to set the date of
petitioner's execution for today. There is no compelling reason for
refusing to follow the procedures that we have adopted for the orderly
disposition of noncapital cases. Indeed, the international aspects of this
case provide an additional reason for adhering to our established Rules
and procedures."10 2 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg echoed Justice Stevens'
sentiments in favor of a stay of execution so as to avoid speedy
deliberation of such a grave matter. Application of the timetable of the
United States Supreme Court would have been an additional measure the
federal government could have taken to delay the execution of Bread and
thereby comply with the Order of the ICJ.
Simply stated, the capacity to review habeas petitions, and in Breard's
case, the denial of the habeas petitions subsequent to the issuance of the
ICJ Order of Provisional Measures, places the violation of the ICJ Order
within the realm of federal control. The United States cannot shirk
responsibility for violations of the Vienna Convention by citing the
complex delegation of authority under the Federal system; "[A] s long as a
branch of the federal government has the formal opportunity to review
state law sentences for potential violations, the state remains subordinate
to the federal foreign affairs power, and it cannot implicate the nation's
international legal responsibility without federal permission."' 0' 3 Just as
domestic tort law encourages parents to discipline their children, so too
99 Richardson, supra note 8, at 129.
100 The Department of Justice could have maintained the same legal position, yet suggest
that the Supreme Court order a stay for diplomatic reasons so that the United States
would appear cooperative in the early stages of the case before the ICJ. Due to
Paraguay's November 2, 1998 request that the case be removed from the Court's List,
whether this position would have aided the United States in the case then pending before
the ICJ will remain unknown.
101 See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1357.
102 Id.
103 Doherty, supra note 34, at 1324-55.
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the doctrine of state responsibility encourages nation-states to bring their
political subdivisions into line with international law. 1
04
V. CONCLUSION
The atrocity of his crimes notwithstanding, Mr. Breard had individual
rights under the Vienna Convention which were violated by the state of
Virginia. Although the Clinton administration asserted that the Vienna
Convention only provided rights to Paraguay and not Mr. Breard, the
question was not yet resolved. The ICJ indicated, in its Order of
Provisional Measures, that the United States should take "all measures at
its disposal"'105 to ensure that Mr. Breard was not executed until the court
could decide whether he had individual rights under the Vienna
Convention.
The issue of whether Mr. Breard actually had rights under the Vienna
Convention remains unresolved. While the language of the treaty, dicta in
Breard v. Greene,10 6 and a press release from the State Department 10 7 all
indicate that he had such rights, 10 8 Mr. Breard was executed before the ICJ
was able to resolve the matter. Furthermore, the Republic of Paraguay
withdrew its case from the Court's List in November, before the ICJ could
decide the matter, for reasons which have not been officially stated.'0 9 The
federal government did not comply with the ICJ Order to take "all
measures at its disposal" 110 to ensure that Mr. Breard was not executed
pending the final decision of the ICJ.
The federal government did not exercise its formal authority, as
limited to the habeas corpus review of state sentences and application of
extradition treaties, to comply with the Order of the ICJ. While the
federalist structure allows the federal government to retain formal
authority, this type of control over cases involving the imposition of the
death penalty on foreign nationals, presents the undesirable situation
where a state becomes an actor on the international stage. The resulting
disputes between state and federal governments over delicate diplomatic
issues appear to "contradict the framer's presumption that the federal
104 Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567
(1997).
105 ICJ Order, supra note 26.
106 See Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1355.
107 Rubin, supra note 61.
108 See Part III of this text for full discussion.
109 Carlos Montero, U.S.-Paraguay: Piracy Trade Sanctions Threat Could Be Lifted
Soon, Inter Press Service, Nov. 12, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WL 19901499 ("Sources
with the Paraguayan government suggest a tradeoff may have occurred in talks with the
U.S. that ended yesterday and that Paraguay's withdrawal of its action brought before the
ICJ last month in The Hague for the Apr. 14 execution of convicted rapist and murderer
Paraguayan citizen Angel Breard").
110 ICJ Order, supra note 26.
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government would serve as the nation's sole representative on the world
stage and that the states would be forbidden from plunging the nation into
international disputes."'
While the federal habeas corpus statutes provide the federal
government with a safety valve mechanism through which it can prevent
violation of international obligations, the state appears to be emerging as
an individual actor on the international scene. Inherent in the United
States' federalist system is the principle that the federal government alone
is responsible for the foreign affairs of the Nation. However, to the extent
that the federal government shifts responsibility for violations of
international law to the states, making states participants in the
international community, such sub-national actors will be less able to deny
international responsibility. As the emerging significance of the state in
the realm of international law will continue to challenge the authority of
the federal government, it is imperative that the federal government
continue to assert its command of foreign affairs through internal
diplomacy.
The federal government was in a position to urge a delay of Breard's
execution, by asserting diplomatic interests, to the United States Supreme
Court and the State of Virginia. Instead of articulating a singular position,
the federal government set forth two contradictory views. Additionally,
the Supreme Court could have simply applied its own rules to delay the
execution of Mr. Breard. None of these additional measures were taken on
behalf of the federal government. The United States hid behind the cloak
of federalism as it trounced the authority of and the respect due the
decisions of the International Court of Justice. The United States' failure
to comply with the ICJ Order was a violation of its international
obligations.
" Greene, 118 S. Ct. at 1325-26.
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